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Occupy Information: The Case for Freedom
of Corporate Information
ROY PELED*
The global financial crisis illustrated that the enormous power amassed by
large corporations can have devastating effect on almost every individual
around the globe in case of a wave of massive corporate failures. Forty-six
years ago, demands for oversight over government operations and the desire
for citizens to become more engaged in the democratic process had helped
ushered in the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). This article argues for
extending a similar general duty of disclosure requirement to corporations
because they hold pertinent information required for democratic participation.
This article examines the justifications for FOIA and their applicability to
corporate information. It reviews existing mechanisms in the U.S. and other
countries, that allow for access to some corporate information, and discusses
how they fall short of meeting the needs of an open and democratic society.
After considering possible arguments against the notion of freedom of
corporate information, it reaches the conclusion that, subject to certain
limitations, it is a much needed legal reform that can contribute significantly to
a better functioning democratic society and a more responsible corporate
world.

* Associate in Law, Columbia Law School; JSD candidate Buchman Faculty of Law,
Tel-Aviv University. Board Member and Former Director General, the Movement for Freedom
of Information in Israel. I am grateful to the following friends and colleagues who have inspired
me and helped to improve this article from previous versions: Justice Daphne Barak Erez,
Michael Birnhack, Ido Baum, Meir Heth, Karine Nahon, Yoram Rabin, Omer Tene, and my
colleagues at the fellows’ workshop at the Columbia Law School.
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It should be as much the aim of those who seek for social
betterment to rid the business world of crimes of cunning as to rid the
entire body politic of crimes of violence . . . The first requisite is
knowledge, full and complete; knowledge which may be made public
to the world. Theodore Roosevelt (1901)

I. INTRODUCTION
The Occupy Protests during the summer 2012, from Zuccoti
Park, New York, to Town Square, Anchorage, and from the
Rothschild Boulevard in Tel-Aviv, to St. Paul’s Cathedral in London,
taught us that socioeconomic priorities might be changing; that we
must reexamine the major institutions that lead our society and our
legal thinking about them. This article suggests the adoption of a
fundamental change in how we currently view corporate
accountability and specifically corporations’ right to conceal
information. Such a change requires parting with deeply rooted
perceptions of corporate rights and corporations’ role in society. In
the following pages, I will advocate a policy change that would
recognize a general right to receive information from corporations,
subject to narrowly construed exceptions.
Nearly 250 years have passed since the enactment of the world’s
first freedom of information (“FOI”) law in the Swedish monarchy.1
Its central function was to restrict the power of the king, while
granting power to the press. Since then, more than ninety countries
have instituted FOI laws, and such laws constitute important tools in
restricting governmental powers, especially a government’s abilities
to curtail civil rights.2 Fittingly, enacting FOI laws was one of the first
legislative measures post-communist countries in Eastern Europe
undertook once released from the yoke of the Soviet Union.3 In the

1. For an English translation of the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act of 1766, considered
to be the world’s first FOI law, see His Majesty’s Gracious Ordinance Relating to Freedom of
Writing and of the Press § 6 (1766) (Peter Hogg’s trans.), in Richard E. Freeman, Andrew C.
Wicks & Bidhan Parmar, Stakeholder Theory and “The Corporate Objective Revisited,” 15
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 364, 368 (2004).
2. “Freedom of information” is the term accepted internationally to describe the right of
the public to receive information from administrative entities. The term is vague, and some
prefer to use “the right to know,” or “right of access to information” to express the same idea.
This article uses these terms to communicate the same idea.
3. For discussions on FOI legislation in Eastern Europe, see John M. Ackerman & Irma E.
Sandovel-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 85, 103, 122 (2006); Article 19, The Global Campaign for Free Expression, Promoting
Practical Access To Democracy: A Survey of Freedom of Information in Central and Eastern
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more veteran democracies, FOI has become a central tool to
empower citizens’ dealings with their government by redistribution
the control of information.
Based on their financial position, several private commercial
corporations are as powerful as the governments of many United
Nation member states.4 Corporations nowadays control information
often similar in significance and magnitude to those in the hands of
If information is indeed power, then these
governments.5
corporations may control as much power as many governments. Yet
these corporations are subject to dramatically less scrutiny than
governments, which can be subject to FOI laws and general
administrative law principles.
This article argues for applying freedom of information doctrines
to curtail the power of corporations6 and to empower individuals and
groups coming into contact with them. It proposes imposing a
“general duty of disclosure” on corporations, in contrast to the
existing disclosure requirements which only apply to specific
positively and explicitly predefined issues, such as financial
information, nutritional data, pollution emissions, and the like.
Europe (2002), available at www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/freedom-ofinformation-survey-of-central-and-e.pdf.
4. See Part II below.
5. Numerous accounts detail how much information is generated and stored globally by
organizations with varying numbers due to the difficulty in measuring this data. But all
estimates agree that data is collected in an ever-accelerating pace. For a list of these attempts to
assess the amount of global information see, JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., BIG DATA: THE NEXT
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY (2001), available at
www.mckinsey.com/insights/ mgi/ research/technology_and_innovation/big_data_the_next_
frontier_for_innovation.
One example of the volume of information held by corporations appeared in a 2008 report
on “petabyte power players” customers of the data warehouse company Teradata. These
included Ebay petabytes of data, and Wal-Mart storing 2.5 petabytes of data. See Eric Lai,
Teradata Creates Elite Club for Petabyte-Plus Data Warehouse Customers, COMPUTERWORLD
(Sept. 10, 2012), www.computerworld.com/s/article/9117159/Teradata_creates_elite_club_for_
peta byte_plus_data_warehouse_customers. Just two years earlier it was estimated that all the
world’s countries outside of North America, Western Europe, and the developed countries of
Asia and the Pacific Rim put together hold no more than 8 petabytes of information (held by
governments, corporations and individuals together). See John F. Grantz, THE EXPANDING
DIGITAL UNIVERSE: A FORECAST OF WORLDWIDE INFORMATION GROWTH THROUGH 2010
(2007), available at www.emc.com/ collateral/analyst-reports/expanding-digital-idc-whitepaper.pdf. In 2012 Microsoft said that for its search engine alone (Bing) it stores no less than
300 petabytes of information. See Paul McDougall, Microsoft Stress-Tests Windows Server 2012
with Bing, INFORMATIONWEEK (Sept. 10, 2012), available at www.informationweek.com/bigdata/news/software/windows8/240001825
/microsoft-stresstests-windows-server-2012-withbing?cid=SBX_bigdata_related_news_Windows _8_big_data&itc=SBX_bigdata_related_news_
Windows_8_big_data.
6. The term “corporations” in this paper refers to commercial corporations. Some of the
arguments presented here will also hold true for nonprofit organizations, but others do not, and
their separate characteristics require a separate discussion.
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This article will first review the rise in power of private
corporations and their entry into a wide range of activities of public
nature. This discussion will provide the foundation for the argument
that tools, such as FOI, should be used to restrain corporate power.
The third section presents areas where substantial right to FOI
already exists. This review will serve two purposes: First, it will show
that the principle of FOI as it applies to corporations already exists in
law. Secondly, it will differentiate between the general duty of
disclosure recommended by this article and existing law. The fourth
section of this article will examine the extent to which widely
accepted justifications for subjecting governments to FOI laws can be
reasonably applied to corporations, as well as some additional
justification unique to corporations. The fifth part will review models
for freedom of corporate information already in use in various
countries. Finally, the last section will establish the justifications for
extending a general duty of disclosure to corporations.
The measures proposed in this article run counter to the way
many view the legal relationships among private citizens,
corporations, and the state. This article intends to justify, through the
prism of freedom of information, a renewed discussion of these
relationships that reflect the contemporary power dynamics among
them.

II. THE STRENGTHENING OF CORPORATE POWER
AND CORPORATIONS’ GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN
THE PUBLIC SPHERE
For centuries, states held power unmatched by other entities
brought about because of their control of force, capital, and
information.7 However, activities and services formerly controlled
and provided by the state have passed to private hands, and as the
power of nations weakens, corporations claim more influence.8 This

7. See generally ALVIN TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT: KNOWLEDGE, WEALTH, AND VIOLENCE
EDGE OF THE 21ST CENTURY (1990) (stating three important sources of power
controlled by the states are 1) Force, as the state hold a monopoly over the application of force
in its territory; 2) Capital, because the state has authority to set and collect taxes; and 3)
Information, as the state was the leading producer and collector of information, and because it
controlled education and information systems).
8. For a discussion of the weakening of the state, see SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF
THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1996); cf. LINDA WEISS,
THE MYTH OF THE POWERLESS STATE (1998) (arguing that states are not weakening by these
processes); for a description of the changes created by globalization in the basic character of
state sovereignty, see SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF
AT THE
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shift in power warrants the need to provide mechanisms to prevent
abuses by corporations.
The dramatic strengthening of corporate power over the past
century is steadily intensifying. According to one study, of the 100
largest world economies in 2010, forty-two were private corporations.9
The tremendous influence of these corporations casts a large shadow
and extends to multiple facets of society. For example, the policy of a
few banks practicing high-risk-taking policy led to the 2008 global
economic crisis.10 General Motors’ decision to close its plant in Flint,
Michigan turned a once thriving city into a ghost town suffering from
high rate of unemployment, drugs, and crimes.11
As corporations amass more power, they also increasingly exert
more control through privatization. Privatization refers to processes
involving the transfer of public property to private hands through
deregulation and outsourcing.12 Privatization invites corporate
involvement in the provision of governmental services and in return,
privatization brings an increased level of government regulation to
the private sphere. An outcome of privatization “has been a
pervasive blurring of the boundaries between the public and private
sectors.”13 Since FOI laws are considered part of public law and
corporate law as part of private law,14 the blurring of boundaries
GLOBALIZATION (1996).
9. Democracy Leadership Council, The World’s Top 50 Economies: 44 countries, six firms,
DLC (July 14, 2010), www.dlc.org/ndol_cie5ae.html?kaid=108&subid=900003&contentid=
255173. A different survey puts the number at 51 of 100 already at the turn of the century. See
generally SARAH ANDERASON & JOHN CAVANAGH, CORPORATE VS. COUNTRY ECONOMIC
CLOUT: THE TOP 100 (2d Ed., 2005). Other researchers have criticized these figures, but even
according to more conservative estimates, no fewer than thirty-seven corporations were listed
among the one hundred largest economies in the world already in 2002. See Paul De Grauwe &
Filip Camerman, How Big Are the Big Multinational Companies, in TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
ECONOMIE EN MANAGEMENT 3 XLVII 311, 317 (2002).
10. See generally MARTIN N. BAILY & DOUGLAS J. ELIOT, THE US Financial AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS: WHERE DO WE STAND AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? (2009).
11. ROGER AND ME (Michael Moor 1989). The title of the film is based on the attempts
made by director Michael Moore to meet with GM CEO, Roger Smith, to discuss his decision to
close the plant. The CEO’s refusal to be interviewed reflects the corporations working
assumption that it owes no explanations to the community, and must only seek the approval of
its shareholders. For another description of the all encompassing effect of a corporation on a
state, see JAMES PHELAN & ROBERT POZEN, THE COMPANY STATE, RALPH NADER’S STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON DUPONT IN DELAWARE (1973).
12. See generally Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1519 (2001) (for additional models) [hereinafter Beermann I].
13. Ralph M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Contract Culture: Dream or Nightmare?,
68 SOC. SERV. REV. 33, 35 (1994).
14. Although an interesting and compelling view has been voiced that “. . . the law of
corporations should be evaluated more as a branch of public law, the kinds of law that concerns
society more generally, such as constitutional law or environmental law” and that “[o]nce
corporate law is correctly seen as public law, it will be clear that significant changes should be
made.” KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 2 (2006).
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challenge traditional classifications and provides the opportunity to
apply FOI principles to the private sector as opposed to limiting them
to public agencies alone.15
Many legal scholars propose imposing public law obligations to
accompany privatization.16 However, relying on privatization alone as
a justification is overly formalistic. Many corporations never become
privatized in the broad sense of the term, yet operate in the public
realms. Cellular communication and internet service providers fit this
description because they control infrastructure of extreme public
importance and possess an abundant amount of information on
individuals such that their conduct may lead to breach of privacy
rights of consumers. The release of “The Global Intelligence Files”
by Wikileaks in February 2012 highlights this problem.17 There,
millions of emails exchanged within “Stratfor,” a private commercial
global intelligence firm, were distributed to the public. The released
information documented a full-blown intelligence apparatus that
engaged in widespread covert monitoring and the selling of
information to private corporations and governments.18 Based on the
clearly public nature of the information, this article will argue the
corporation should be viewed as a public entity.

15. This article does not argue that corporations and governments have become to be one
that they are indistinguishable. It does argue that many characteristics of the latter have come
to characterize the former as well, and this should bear consequences. States’ monopoly over
the use of physical force is at least one significant difference between governments and
corporations. Max Weber, Politics as Vocation (1919), available at www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/
ethos/Weber-vocation.pdf. But even so, governments are rapidly authorizing corporations to
apply forces to reach various ends. For a nonexhaustive list of examples, see P.W. SINGER,
CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY (2003). In some cases they
are even given at least a temporary “free hand” to use force. Id. at 3–4.
16. Daphne Barak-Erez, Civil Rights in the Privatized State: A Comparative View, 28
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 503, 511–13 (1999); Daphne Barak-Frez, A State Action Doctrine for an
Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 (1995); Jack M. Beermann, Administrative
Law-Like Obligations on Private(ized) Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717 (2002) [hereinafter
Beermann II]; Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003);
David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, Outsourcing the Constitution and
Administrative Law Norms, 35 ADMIN. REV. OF PUB. ADMIN. 103 (2005).
17. THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE FILES (Feb. 27, 2012), available at wikileaks.org/ thegifiles.html.
18. The files show systematic monitoring of activists whose work was perceived as
potentially damaging to Stratfor clients’ interests, for instance those involved in the campaign
for victims of the 1984 Bhopal, India tragedy. See Release Stratford monitored Bhopal activists
including The Yes Men for Dow Chemical and Union Carbide, THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
FILES,
http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2012-02-27-00-stratford-monitored-bhopalactivists-including.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). The corporation has even been presented as
a “shadow” CIA. See Wikileaks Targets Global Risk Company Stratfor, REUTERS (Feb. 27,
www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/27/wikileaks-stratfor-idUSL5E8DR
2012), available at
0120120227.
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III. EXISTING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
Slowly but steadily, much has been done over the past century to
increase corporate transparency. During the second half of the 20th
century the U.S. enacted legislations demanding consumer product
disclosure that recognized the right of consumers to receive
information on an array of consumer goods and services, including
the ingredients used in food products,19 results of clinical tests
performed on pharmaceutical products,20 any potential harmful
components in children’s products,21 information on the danger of
medical treatment and quality of health care institutions,22 and the
management of private data.23 The U.S. similarly enacted laws
requiring corporations in the industrial sector to document and report
certain actions significantly affecting the environment,24 including the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
(“EPCRA”) passed in 1985 to compel factories to report to state and
local authorities all dangerous substances created and released into

19. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051• 2089 (2012); Consumer
Credit Disclosure Law, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601• 1667F (2012); Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended in scattered section of 21
U.S.C.); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-2811 (2012); Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-399D (2012); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (USA), 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1451–1461 (2012); Consumer Information Act 1978 (Act No. 1/1978).
20. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. Law No. 110–85,
121 Stat 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
21. See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-314, 122
Stat. 3016 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
22. See Aharon D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent:
Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999).
23. For California law on the management of private data, see Breach Disclosure Statute,
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.29 (2012). Similar legislation was enacted in thirty-three U.S. states. See
Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 913, 915 (2006). Such law already exists in Japan, see id. at 915 n.8, and is gaining
momentum in other countries, see Alana Maurushat, Data Breach Notification Law Across the
World from California to Australia, UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES FACULTY OF LAW
RESEARCH SERIES 11, 15 (2009).
24. For a general description of several of these laws, see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, www.epa.gov/epahome/r2k.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
The first international binding obligation that requires signatories to disclose pollutant
emission was the adopted in 2003 under the Kiev Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer
Registers. The Protocol became valid in October 2009, after it was ratified by half of the 36
nations. UNECE, www.unece.org/env/pp/prtr.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). The Protocol
requires member states to create nation-wide pollutant release and transfer registers open to the
public and accessible on the internet.
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the environment as a result of their operations.25 Similar regulations
were enacted in the United Kingdom in 2004.26
Progress has also been made in the financial sector where public
corporations,27 and to a lesser extent privately owned companies, must
disclose significant financial information to the public. The change,
however, is far from sufficient. While the economic crisis of 192928
and the public outcry following the Enron and Worldcom debacle
served as backdrops for meaningful legislative steps in imposing
disclosure obligations on corporations,29 the 2008 global financial
crisis did not produced similar legislative progress. Some explain this
phenomenon by arguing that legislative changes have, by and large,
been exhausted as an effective remedy to market failures, and that
new preventive measures should be sought elsewhere.30 Furthermore,
while progress has been made, the current financial disclosure regime
applies mostly to publicly traded corporations and not closely-held
corporations.
The current regulations require that companies
disclose pertinent information to shareholders, but do not require
disclosure of information to other parties who may require protection
and be interested, for instance employees, suppliers, and consumers.
Financial losses sustained by workers and consumers may at times be
greater than losses sustained by shareholders.31

25. Emergency planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 1101–11050
(2012).
26. The Environmental Information Regulations 2004, S.I. 2004 No. 3391 (U.K.). The law
compels companies to make information available to the public by electronic means. Id. at § 4.
27. The listing of public companies for trade and debt, and their disclosure obligations in
the U.S. were imposed in several federal legislations, the most important of them being:
Securities Act of 1933 §§ 1–28, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77 (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 1–
39, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (2012) [hereinafter SEC Act]; The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 7201 (2012) [hereinafter SOX Act]. For a description of the legislations and their full
text, see The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, www.sec.gov/ about/laws.shtml (last visited July 31, 2012).
28. See Joel Seligman, Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J.
CORP. L. 1 (1983)
29. The SOX Act was legislated with a majority of 334 supporters against 90 opposed in the
House of Representatives (Final Vote Results for Roll Call, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK (Apr. 24, 2002), clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll110.xml), and with a
majority of 99 supporters with none opposed in the Senate (U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 102nd
Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE LEGISLATION AND RECORDS (July 25, 2002),
www.senate.gov/legislative/ LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=
2&vote=00192).
30. See, e.g., Emilios Avgouleas, Univ. of Manchester, The Global Financial Crisis, the
Disclosure Paradigm, and European Financial Regulation: the Case for Reform, Address at the
EUROFRAME conference (June 1, 2009) (arguing that much information was available to
investors to point towards a possible crisis, yet they failed to respond in the expected way,
necessitating interventionist regulation beyond disclosure enforcement).
31. See, e.g., Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, supra note 1, at 346.
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Presently, there is no legal duty to disclose information of the
type that was uncovered by the Enron investigation,32 including
boundless wastefulness, attempts to influence political appointments,
nepotism, and more.33 In a FOI regime, an investigative reporter
could demand certain information from the company, improper
practices like the ones in Enron would have been more difficult to
hide and potentially limited the magnitude of the tragedy. However,
any demand to allow access to such information in the present legal
situation would be ignored and considered ludicrous.
While corporations are required to disclose significantly more
information than in the past, disclosure remains the exception to the
general rule of secrecy.

IV. THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST FREEDOM OF
CORPORATE INFORMATION
Freedom of information laws exist today in almost every liberal
democracy and even in several nondemocratic states;34 many deem
FOI a constitutional right.35 Four justifications have been used for
recognizing FOI in the government context. Using these justifications
as bases, this article will apply them to information held by private
corporations.36 After doing so and providing counter arguments

32. Tim Grieve, The Decline and Fall of the Enron Empire (2003), available at
dir.salon.com/ story/news/feature/2003/10/14/enron/index.html.
33. The documents and correspondence that were seized during the investigation of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are available in full over the internet on several
websites that have added search and referencing services for public use of those interested or
the simply curious. See, e.g., Public Domain Enron Email Corpus and Database, (July 31, 2012),
www.enron-mail.com. This published material raises serious questions in regard to the balancing
of the right of the public to be informed, and the right for privacy, which are worthy of an
additional in depth discussion, but which lie outside the scope of this article.
34. For the list of the states in which Freedom of Information Acts were enacted up to
September 2009, see Roger Vleugels, Overview of All 90 FOIA Countries and Territories,
available at right2info.org/laws/Vleugels-Overview-86-FOIA-Countries-9.08.pdf.
Since this publication, freedom of information acts have also been legislated in Guatemala,
Uruguay, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, the Moldavian islands, Malta, Nigeria and the
Philippines. However, in some of these countries, they have yet to come into effect.
35. In two thirds of the countries belonging to the European Union Council, freedom of
information is enumerated in the constitution, see Access to Information: A Fundamental
Right, A Universal Standard (Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.access-info.org/documents/
Access_Docs/Thinking/Get_Connected/Access_Info_Europe_Briefing_Paper.pdf.
For an extensive discussion of the constitutional characteristics of the right, see Roy Peled
& Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right to Know, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 357, 360
(2011).
36. The summary of the justifications as they applies to the government is based on the
analysis appearing in Rabin and Peled. Peled & Rabin, supra note 35, at 360.
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against their applicability, I will further provide justifications that are
unique to commercial corporations.
A. APPLYING GENERAL FOI JUSTIFICATIONS TO CORPORATE
INFORMATION

1. The Political–Democratic Justification
The right to information is a prerequisite to a democratic regime
because such a right enables citizens to actively participate in the
democratic process, a critical element of democracy. Decisions made
by citizens based on information filtered by the government cannot
be considered free and democratic.37 While this justifies FOI in the
context of the government, can the same be said that involvement in
the democratic process requires that citizens have the right to access
information held by corporations?
To answer this question, take the healthcare debate under the
There, the Health
Clinton administration as an illustration.38
Insurance Association of America (“HIAA”), comprising of heads of
insurance companies, was able to successfully prevent the bill from
becoming law, in large part because it could run a campaign without
having to disclose potentially damaging information, because it was
not subject to FOI laws. For example, the fact that the tobacco
industry, led by the Philip Morris Corporation, was a significant
financer of the opposing campaign was not revealed until years later
when the tobacco companies were obligated to release internal
documents as part of a master-settlement agreement reached in a
lawsuit of forty-six U.S. states against the major tobacco companies.39
37. This was the background for the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966
in the United States, Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966), and in many other
democracies in the years to follow. Such as France, “Law on Access to Administrative
Documents (1978), Canada “Access to Information Act” (1982), The United Kingdom
“Freedom of Information Act” (2000) and Germany”: Informationsfreiheitsgesetz ” (2005). For
the full list of FOI Laws, see Vluegels, supra note 34.
38. For a description of the public debate around the plan, and the lack of reliable
information on its details, see Derek Bok, The Great Health Care Debate of 1993-94, 2 PUBLIC
TALK: ONLINE JOURNAL OF DISCURSE LEADERSHIP (1998); KANT PATEL, HEALTH CARE
POLITICS AND POLICY IN AMERICA 383–389 (3rd ed. 2006)Lisa Disch, Publicity - Stunt
Participation and Sound Bite Polemics: The Health Care Debate 1993-1994, 21 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL’Y & L. 3 (1996)Raymond L. Goldsteen et al., Harry and Louise and the Health Care
Reform: Romancing Public Opinion, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1325 (2001).
39. Master Settlement Agreement, National Association of Attorneys General, § 4, Nov.
23, 1998, available at www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msapdf/1109185724_1032468
605_cigmsa.pdf.
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These documents exposed Philip Morris as financing diverse
“grassroots” initiatives and media advertising campaigns, activating
biased “commentators,” initiating pseudo-scientific conventions, and
more.40 But such information that may have negatively affected the
private healthcare system was kept from the public, preventing the
public from making a well-informed decision about the health care
bill.41 Conversely, because the government was subject to the
Freedom of Information Act, any attempts to raise funds and
generate “popular” activity in support of the reform were made
public, and were accompanied by much criticism.42 In fact, the
opposition could more easily obtain information from the
government in order to expose the campaign's “behind the scenes”
information.43
Corporations are central players in the decision-making
processes in any western democracy as they exert as much influence
as senior government executives or political parties. In order for
citizens to participate in the democratic process, information held by
corporations should be made widely and easily available so that the
public may form its views when partaking in the political process.
2. The Oversight Justification
In the context of imposing FOI on the government, the public
has a right to inspect the activities of public entities in order to
examine these organizations’ level of efficiency and to uncover any
Effective
structural and organizational flaws and corruption.44
oversight of government activities requires the government to be

40. The documents published in the settlement agreement appear on a dedicated Chicago
University website that allows document searches and displaying, see legacy.library.ucsf.edu.
For documents exposing the company involvement in anti-reform activities, see, e.g.,
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/action/document/page?tid=psy67c00&page=1;
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/
tid/blz55e00; legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/san09e00/pdf.
41. This question stood at the root of class action lawsuits against medical insurance
companies in the U.S., and in their context, a request was made for a decision that would
require the companies to publicize incentives given to doctors; while the request to submit the
class action suits was denied, the courts ordered that the information on controversial incentives
be made public.
42. Online NewsHour: The Healthcare Debate Leading up to Clinton’s Healthcare Address
to Congress; Ezra Klein, The Lessons of ‘94, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 20, 2008,
www.prospect.org /cs/articles?article=the_lessons_of_94.
43. “White House Release Task Force Documents,” ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, http://www.aapsonline.org/newsletters/oct94.htm.
For the
documents themselves see, www.aapsonline.org/clinton/AAPS/TASKFORC.pdf (last visited
Sept. 11, 2012).
44. Peled & Rabin, supra note 35, at 366.
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transparent, which helps to reduce corruption.45 Similarly, the
significant influence of corporations in public discourse warrants
important interest in supervising corporate activities carried out in
good faith, but that might be flawed due to negligence, lack of
professionalism, excess risk-taking or other faults of character or
judgment which could affect public interests.
Take as an illustration the accounts that followed the 2003
Columbia space shuttle disaster. In the aftermath of this tragic event,
NASA received requests for information regarding possible causes of
the explosion pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
While NASA complied with most of the public’s requests46 the
involvement of United Space Alliance Corporation (“United Space”),
a company owned jointly by Boeing and Lockheed Martin, restricted
the amount of information the public could access and thus limited
the public’s ability to properly evaluate various aspects of the event.
Because United Space was not bound by FOIA, it did not have to
disclose information, despite testimonies by high-ranking NASA
officials stating that United Space’s employees were an integral part
of the flawed decision-making process that resulted in the disaster.47
Considering the public interest in supervising parties involved in
the Columbia disaster, there is no substantial difference between
NASA and United Space. Yet, current laws do not compel
corporations to disclose interested information. Should corporations
be held accountable to the general public in this particular scenario,
or when they decide to shut down a plant, resulting in thousands in
layoffs as was the case in Flint, Michigan,48 or when a bank collapses
putting at stake its clients’ life savings? What level of accountability
should corporations be subject to the public?
According to Anita Allen, accountability operates in the field of
public administration and corporate governance,49 but FOI laws are
mechanics of “state accountability.”50 However, Allen’s rationales
supporting this proposition—including consent, reliance, relationship,

45. This is a widespread notion, and in the author’s view, a valid one as well. However it is
not undisputed. For supporting evidence, see Catherina Lindstedt & Daniel Naurin,
Transparency and Corruption: The Conditional Significance of a Free Press, 5 QOG WORKING
PAPER SERIES, 2005, available at www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1350/1350633_2005_5lindstedt_naurin.pdf. For a different view, see Samia Tavares, Do Freedom of Information Laws
Decrease Corruption?, MPRA PAPER, no. 3560, Nov. 2007, available at http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/3560.
46. NASA, Summary of Records Released under Freedom of Information Act,
www.nasa.gov/ columbia/foia/index.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
47. Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra note 16, at 106
48. RODGER AND ME, supra note 11.
49. ANITA ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING 22 (2003).
50. Id.
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and public need—only marginally distinguish between states and
corporations. Public officials have indeed implicitly conceded to
operating in the sunlight, and it is hard to say the same of officials in
commercial corporations.51 However, implicit consent is the result of
public atmosphere and expectations. These did not exist a century
ago when government officials would not have conceded to the
openness we know today. This might change for corporate officials in
the future as well; Reliance is often induced by corporations. Clearly
GM employees in Flint, Michigan relied on GM for their livelihood,
just as people whose life savings depended on the prudence of
managers at Lehman Brothers relied on them. Relationships also
induce accountability.52 But employees, customers, providers, even
neighbors, are all engaged in relationships that can be seen to render
the corporation accountable to them. Finally, people are accountable
to the public where there is a compelling public interest, such as that
of the accountability of people with AIDS or tuberculosis, because of
the government’s responsibility to contain highly contagious diseases.
But the same might be said for governmental obligation to protect a
public interest such as the stability of the financial sector.
According to Allen, accountability requires accessibility and
transparency. Allen’s justifications fit corporations just as they fit
governments and strengthen the argument for corporate
transparency.
3. The Instrumental Justification
The rationale for extending FOI regime to the government is the
idea that FOI is instrumental, if not a necessary link, for the exercise
of numerous civil rights, including the right to freedom of
expression.53 The ability to advocate for social rights hinges on the
ability to access information. The growing effectiveness of civil
society organizations to sway public policy has been credited to a
greater access to information, which allows these organizations to
stand as equals before government representatives, who traditionally
51. Id.
52. See supra note 49.
53. John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandovel-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom
of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 88–89 (2006); see also Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Freedom of
opinion and expression” found in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948 includes the right “to request and receive information.”); see also International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (16 Dec., 1966) (Article 19 states that
“[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include the freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.”).
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enjoyed a substantial advantage as a result of their exclusive control
of information.54
But governments no longer hold a monopoly over the creation or
distribution of information. As corporations gain more power and as
privatization blurs the boundaries between the private and public
realms, corporations are active players in both the creation and
distribution of information. As too much unchecked power in the
hands of government lead to corruption and at times, human rights
abuses, the same is true when power is left unchecked in the hands of
corporations; the Wikileaks illustration above serves as an example of
such abuse.
As access to information held by the government is necessary to
stand as equal before the government, the same is true for needing
access to information held by corporations to advance one’s
viewpoint in society. For instance, in order for interested parties to
effectively raise awareness of America’s continued presence in Iraq
requires access to information such as the fact that more than 64,000
private contractors were left in Iraq after the U.S. withdrew its forces
beginning August 2010.55 But without more stringent laws obligating
private corporations to be more transparent, advocates are faced with
a difficult task in advancing their position, leaving the public with the
false impression that American engagement in Iraq has ceased.
Furthermore, individuals directly affected by the actions of
private contractors in Iraq and other war zones may need access to
information held by these corporations to effectively hold them
accountable for human rights abuses. Contrast these two cases.
Using the FOIA, U.S. human rights organizations successfully
compelled the CIA as well as the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel to turn over information revealing torture methods
inflicted on Guantanamo Bay detainees by the CIA.56 In contrast,
despite investigations into reports of detainee abuses by private
corporate employees at the Abu-Ghraib prison,57 the public did not
gain similar access to information regarding human rights abuses by

54. JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER OF CTIIZEN GROUPS
132 (1999); THEDA SKOCPOL, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 377 (1999).
55. COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN,
TRANSFORMING WARTIME CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS; FINAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS (August 2011) available at www.wartimecontracting.gov. For many of
these documents, see Accountability for Torture, ACLU, www.aclu.org/accountability/
released.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
56. For many of these documents, see accountability for torture, ACLU, www.aclu.org/
accountability/released.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
57. For a detailed description of such allegations, see Second Amended Complaint, Al Rawi
v. Titan Corp., No. 04CV 1143 R, 2004 WL 1380538 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2004).

PELED_JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2013

CORPORATE INFORMATION

2/4/2013 1:15 PM

275

employees of the private corporations employed in the facility.58
While some relevant information was disclosed in the course of
litigation, the activities of private contractors remain immune from
inspection.59
4. The Proprietary Justification60
The rationale for extending FOI to the government is the idea
that information is property, and public authorities are trustees while
citizens are owners and beneficiaries of such property. As such,
citizens are entitled to have free access to such information, and
control of information by civil servants is justifiable as a result of their
positions as public trustees. Any limits on the public’s access to such
information should emanate only from the need to protect the
interests of other owners, that is, other members of the general
public.
Similarly, corporation could be said to be trustee of information,
holding it in trust for its owner, the public. However, since the
owners of a corporation are shareholders, information belongs to the
shareholders, and them alone, and thus a corporation does not owe
an obligation to the public to use or access its property. Underlying
this rationale is the conventional perception that a person’s property
61
is his “sole and despotic dominion,” and that he can utilize this
property as he sees fit, including denying others the right to use or
access it. In this view, a corporation may exclude others from using
and accessing its information.
58. What were the internal memos directing employees of Titan and CACI, two private
contractors providing translation and interrogation services to the U.S. military, in regard to
treatment of detainees? How were complaints dealt with, if at all? What were the standards for
hiring individuals to work for these companies?
59. While the exposure of the Abu-Ghraib scandal moved legislators and international
institutions to act, no substantive change came of it. In 2007, then Senator Barak Obama
introduced a bill to increase transparency in the work of military contractors, but the bill never
became law. Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of
2007, S. 674, 110th Cong. (2007). The U.N. Human Rights Council issued a report calling on the
U.S. “to ensure that all requirements for transparency and oversight apply when contracting.”
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, A/
HRC/15/25/Add.3 (July 2, 2010). Nevertheless, the U.N. report did not have much meaningful
impact on the U.S.
60. For purposes of this discussion, I do not intend to address the question of the
proprietary status of information. Information is currently recognized as property. The
question here is what proprietary regime ought to be applied to information in the possession of
commercial corporations. Extensive writings have addressed the proprietary status of
information. See, e.g., Arthur S. ; ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION
(1995).
61. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1847)

PELED_JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

276

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

2/4/2013 1:15 PM

9:2

Over the past decades, however, scholars have proposednew
views on the rights and entitlements of property ownership.62 The
“stakeholder theory,”63 which arose in the mid-1980s,64 defines a
stakeholder as “any group or individual that is affected by, or can
affect the achieving of the objectives of the organization.”65 This view
spawned new theories about the duties corporations owe to their
stakeholders,66 including the sharing of information with
stakeholders.67 These theories, however, deal with the expectation
that a corporation will, on its own and as part of its “social
responsibility,” determine to what level they would recognize the
interests of its stakeholders. Thus the question as to how much
corporations must disclose to their different “stakeholders” remains a
determination made by corporate management and owners.
Other scholars have suggested more far-reaching approaches to
the division of rights within a corporation. Robert Dahl considers
giant corporations such as General Motors to be political institutions
and, as such, ownership in them should not be treated as belonging to
the field of private property.68 Joseph Singer, in a 1988 article,69claims
that since employees have a possessory right to their place of
employment,70 employees should be allowed to receive information
relevant to help them determine whether the owners are drawing
dividends in a way that might jeopardize the stability of the business,
or information that would allow them to recognize signs that the
business might be closing.71 John McCall argues that employees’ right
to co-determine corporate policy (from coffee-break schedule to

62. See, e.g., M. A. Honroe, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. G.
Guest ed., 1961); STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990).
63. The theory was first presented in R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT:
A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984). For a review of different uses of the term, see
64. Similar ideas were presented as early as 1932, see
65. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH
at 46 (1984).
66. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, where the court ruled that “The business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of stockholders. The powers of
the directors are to be employed for that end.” 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
67. In a rating of 12 levels of interest on “interest holders” in the life of the corporation,
informing was rated as third by the writers, Friedman and Mills. It should be noted that
informing is discussed there, and this is a term that leaves the initiative in the hands of the
organizations. It is less intrusive than an obligation to provide access to information seekers.
However, the difference is not necessarily substantial in regard to organizations that are not
hiding information for improper purposes.
68. Robert A. Dahl, Governing the Giant Corporation, in CORPORATE POWER IN
AMERICA 10, 18 (Ralph Nader & Mark J. Green eds., 1973).
69. Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
70. Id. at 699.
71. Id. at 740.

PELED_JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2013

CORPORATE INFORMATION

2/4/2013 1:15 PM

277

closing plants) should trump current understanding of property
rights.72
Important for our discussion here is that today’s discourse on
property recognizes various kinds and degrees of proprietary rights.
Ownership is no longer necessarily seen as a right that precludes all
others from access to the property, especially when the property is
publicly situated. Furthermore, property owners are often subjected
to various limitations on how to manage their private property.73
Thus, that information is held by a corporation cannot preclude its
duty to allow the public to access to such information.
B. DEFENDING “CORPORATE RIGHTS”
Countering the idea that the public has the right to be informed
is the rationale that corporations have guaranteed constitutional
rights.74 While the presumption that corporations should be afforded
basic constitutional rights was not the initial interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution,75 any doubt otherwise is put to rest following the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Elections

72. John J. McCall, Employee Voice in Corporate Governance: A Defense of Strong
Participation Rights, 11 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY 195, 195 (2001).
73. For instance zoning laws and regulatory takings.
74. Int’l. Dairy Foods Ass’n. v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a
Vermont state law requiring the labeling of products manufactured from growth hormone
injected cows unconstitutional because it violates the corporation’s freedom to refrain from
speech). See Dean Ritz, When Silence is Not Golden: Negative Free Speech and Human Rights
for Corporations, 5 BY WHAT AUTHORITY 2 (2003), available at poclad.org/bwa/spring03.htm.
75. The recognition that U.S. corporations are guaranteed constitutional rights came nearly
a century after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. The initial interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution was that only fresh and blood human beings are afforded constitutional rights; in
fact, in 1855, the U.S. Supreme Court still referred to corporations as an “artificial invention.”
Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 366 (1855) (Campbell, J. dissenting) (stating that “it cannot be“
that “a mere legal entity, an artificial person, invisible, intangible, can be a citizen of the United
States in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution.”). This changed in 1886, when
a comment was added to the report of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. P.
R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). The report documented oral exchange in courtroom by the justices
expressing their opinion, before the parties begun arguments, that a corporation should be
considered a "person" and should enjoy the right of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Despite frequent misquotes that cite it as a precedent, in reality, it is not part of
the ruling. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. City of New York 8 S. Ct. 1385, 1387 (1886); Kentucky
Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp. 262 US 544, 500 (1923); First Nat. Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti 435 US 765, 822.
For recount of the statements between the justices, see Frank Wagner, Davis Strikes
Again!, 23(2) THE CATCHLINE: BULLETIN OF THE ASSOCIATION OF REPORTERS OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS (2005), available at arjd.washlaw.edu/Catchline_april_2005.htm. A copy of the
original correspondence is available at www.de-fact-o.com/factread.php?id=33.
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Committee.76 There, the Court ruled that corporations are afforded
the right to freedom of expression, and Congress may not limit
corporations’ right to make political expenditures for electioneering
communications, a form of speech, unless there is a compelling
government interest.77 While the Court admitted corporations are
merely “associations of citizens,”78 it struck down statutory provisions
requiring corporations that spend money on electioneering
communications to disclose their identity.79 Since Citizens United,
corporations enjoy immense freedom to spend on election
campaigns.80
Advocates of corporations possessing constitutional rights base
their position on the following rationales: (1) the recognition of
corporate right protects the people standing behind the corporation,
namely, the shareholders; (2) in effect, this protects individuals’
freedom of association; and (3) corporations perform a vital function
in society. This article will respond to each of the rationales put
forward.81
First, the assertion that constitutional protection for corporations
is necessary to protect constitutional rights of its shareholders is
without merit. There is no reason why shareholders should not be
brought center stage to examine the actual harm they may personally
sustain. For example, assume a surprise inspection by the tax
authorities at a company’s headquarters amounts to violation of the
corporation’s constitutional rights to privacy. Here, what needs to be
examined is whether such an inspection breaches the shareholders’
right to privacy without having to resort to examining the
constitutional rights of the corporation. One could examine the two
rights separately and indeed, such analysis may lead to different
results.82 In the same fashion, one need not consider whether the
marking of milk products in Vermont violates the corporation’s “right

76. Citizens United v. Federal Elections Committee, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
77. Id. at 898 .
78. Id. at 900.
79. Id. at 913.
80. See, e.g., Speechnow.org v. Fed. Election Comm., 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding
that Political Action Committees (“PACs”) that spend money on electioneering activities, but
do not contribute to other PACs or directly to candidates’ campaigns, may receive unlimited
donations from undisclosed donor’s).
81. These arguments were presented by Prof. Aharon Barak, retired President of the
Supreme Court of Israel in HCJ 4593/05 United Mizrachi Bank v. the Prime Minister of Israel
(2006) (in Hebrew).
82. The corporation’s right to privacy is protected under the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution. In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978), the Supreme Court held
that spot inspection of federal safety authorities at a workplace violated the corporation’s
constitutional right of privacy.
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not to be forced to speech” but whether forcing such speech upon the
corporation is the same as forcing it upon shareholders.
Second, the basis for allowing corporations to assert protection
under the U.S. Constitution as a mean to protect individuals’ freedom
of association—because people should not be deprived of
constitutional rights when they act collectively—is also flawed.
Freedom of association entitles individuals to certain rights such that
denial of some of these may indeed render freedom to association
meaningless. To deny unions’ collective bargaining power, for
example, would effectively render freedom of association
meaningless. But other rights, while beneficial to the freedom of
association, are not the raison d’etre for the freedom of association,
and the denial of them cannot be said to violate this right. For
instance, providing incorporated businesses with lower tax rates
clearly benefits these businesses, but raising taxes cannot be said to
violate shareholders’ freedom of association, even if higher taxes
make incorporation less appealing.
Finally, the rationale that corporations should be afforded
constitutional because corporations perform a vital function in society
is meritless. While corporations undoubtedly fulfill a vital role in
society, this fact alone does not justify affording them constitutional
rights. Much like corporations, governments also provide society
with vital functions and yet governments are not given any
constitutional rights, nor claim any natural or pre-legal rights. They
are allowed to carry out only those actions explicitly established by
law.
But while the rationales for allowing corporations to assert rights
under the U.S. Constitution are precarious at best, we will proceeds
assuming that corporations are indeed entitled to them.
1. The Breach of the Right to Property
The basis for asserting that corporations should not be subject to
a FOI regime is that doing so would violate their right to property,
which we must also assume constitutes the right to prevent public
access.83 But even when we assume that corporations possess the right
to property, scholars such as Hanoch Dagan maintain that under
certain contexts, the right to property itself obligates the owner to

83. For a comprehensive description, supporters, and critics of the concept that property
right does not necessarily encompass the right to exclude others from use and access, see
generally Hanoch Dagan, Exclusion and Inclusion in Property, 109 TEL-AVIV UNIV. LEGAL
WORKING PAPERS SERIES (2009).
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grant public access.84 According to Dagan, property ownership is a
relationship status between the owner and his community, such that
in return for society making available its resources to protect the
owner’s property,85 society then bears an obligation to protect its
members who are not the owners of such property.86 Indeed, where
public access to proprietary information does not harm the owner’s
reasonable enjoyment of such property, permitting public access is
not merely appropriate but a duty that originates from the owner’s
social responsibility that is integral to his property right.87
It is important to distinguish the following two arguments about
property rights. First is the argument that the value of a corporation
depreciates when information about certain property is disclosed.
For instance, “the Coca Cola formula” is a valuable property that
would lose value if disclosed to the public). In this scenario, the
public should not have access rights. Distinguish this argument from
the second argument, which asserts that the corporation would lose
profits if it were required to disclose information it deems harmful to
the corporation, which is different from preventing public access to an
invention as in the Coca Cola formula. Under the second scenario,
the public should have access rights. Publishing an internal report
exposing a bank’s corruption by management, for example, could
likely result in profit losses, but withholding such information harms
stakeholders who hold some access rights.
2. Breach of the “Freedom of Commercial Speech”
Some argue that disclosure rules constitute “forced speech” and
88
thus violate the right of corporations to refrain from speaking. This
argument has two weaknesses. First, the right to refrain from
providing factual information is counter to declared objectives of
commercial free speech, which supports the search for truth.89
84. See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011).
85. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 772 (1999).
86. See also Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1255, 1259 (2006).
87. Conceptions of property rights like that of Dagan’s allow us to perceive this right in
different forms under different contexts. It is easy, for example, to accept that an owner has a
right to deny an uninvited guest entry into her home without questioning her motive. Yet we
will question the motive of a storeowner who denies customers access into his store, if he does
so due to such factors as the customers’ race. The storeowner cannot simply justify his action by
claiming that he has an absolute, unfettered right to exclude.
88. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTING’S
L.J. 577, n.206 (1989); TR Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, CARDOZO
L.REV., 2586.
89. Abram v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, “the best test of truth is
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Withholding
information,
particularly
factual
information,
undermines this objective and, therefore, should not be allowed to
enjoy constitutional protection for commercial freedom of speech.90
Second, the argument conflates the distinction between (1) the
existing disclosure duties and (2) the recognition of the right to access
corporate information. Compelling disclosure requires corporations
to actively take steps to present information to the public.
Corporations are forced to “act” counter to their desires. One might
argue, with some difficulty as described above, that this breaches the
corporations’ freedom to refrain from speech. On the other hand,
recognition of a right to access corporate information is in this sense a
much “softer” enforcement of speech because it merely requires
corporations to give public access to their documents, where minimal
action is required and where the corporations are not providing any
particular expression on the issue.91 Corporations, for example, would
allow public access to raw data and research results conducted by
their research department, relating to the effects of the hormones.
Corporations would not be required to make any declarations, for
instance, in SEC filings. They would merely provide information in
its present state to the requesting party.
3. Right to Privacy
Whether corporations are guaranteed the right to privacy such
that it enjoys protection from FIO laws is inconclusive according to
case law. For much of the early half of the 20th century, the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to extend the same privacy rights to
corporations that are available to individuals.92 But in 1978, the

the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . . That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution); Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring, “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies . . . the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence”).
90. One might mistakenly conclude that the same may be applied to individual speech. Yet
forcing an individual to speak breaches his right to liberty, a right not easily applied to a
corporation. For reasons discussed above, forcing the corporation “to speak” has little to do
with forced speech of the individuals “behind it,” and hence the same objections do not apply.
91. Both systems are not necessarily interchangeable. At times a FOI rule of law could
make disclosure obligations unnecessary, but sometimes it would still be practically necessary to
obligate the manufacturer to disclose the information on his own to the consumer exposed
directly to the products, and not to wait for a request of information from the public.
92. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) (holding that a corporation may not
withhold documents based on the argument that disclosure violates corporations’ right against
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment); U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652
(1950) (holding that while General Motors enjoys some rights to privacy, it cannot demand the
same extent of privacy protection offered to individuals); see also, U.S. v. Agriprocessors, Inc.,
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Supreme Court deviated from its previous decisions when it held that
a law permitting labor law enforcement agencies to conduct surprise
inspections of private businesses as unconstitutional as a breached of
the corporation's privacy right under the Fourth Amendment.93 Yet
again, the Supreme Court changed course in 2011 when it held that a
corporation does not enjoy “personal information” exemption in
section 7(c) of the U.S. FOIA in AT&T v. FCC.94 There, the Court
upheld the FCC’s decision to disclose to a FOIA requestor
information collected in the course of an investigation into alleged
corporate misconducts when the corporation was implementing a
federal government program. Notwithstanding this recent decision,
and despite a checkered history in this area, we can surmise that
corporations do enjoy some degree of privacy protection, albeit not to
an equal level or degree offered to individual.95
Some scholars, such as Richard Posner,96 argue that corporations
should be granted even greater degree of privacy protection than that
enjoy by individuals. In most cases, Posner reasons, individuals avoid
disclosing information not so they could be “left alone,”97 but rather
to interact with others and to use private information to mislead and
manipulate others.98 Conversely, businesses withhold information to
promote the public interest of compensating entrepreneurs.99
Posner’s argument, however, fails for two reasons.100 First, there
is no justification to prefer the right to privacy where withholding
information may likely prevent the public from having well-informed
public debates. A great deal of the information withheld by
corporations meets this description.101 Second, Posner’s argument that

No. 08–CR–1324–LRR, 2009 WL 2255729, at 4 (N.D. Iowa 2009).(adopting the rule in Morton
Salt, the court dismisses the claim that a corporation can be considered a person for purposes of
privacy protection).
93. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 325–26 (1978).
94. F.C.C. v. AT&T, 131 S.Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (the court opined that while there are
precedents establishing that a corporation can legally be “a person,” there is no such rule to
suggest that “personal” includes “corporate”).
95. As a point of comparison, in Australia the Supreme Court in the year 2001 rejected the
argument that a corporation has a right to privacy. See generally Lee A. Bygrave, A Right to
Privacy for Corporations? Lenah in an International Context, 8 CONTEXT 130 (2001).
96. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, 2 REGULATION 19 (1978).
97. Louis Brandies & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195–96
(1890).
98. Posner, supra note 97 at 20.
99. See supra note 98, at 25. Interestingly, Posner does not contemplate whether
corporations, too, withhold information to manipulate others.
100. The writer’s opinion is that there are good reasons to not apply these conclusions to the
privacy of individuals, and the right to receive information from them, as Posner suggests, but
for the purposes of this discussion we need not expound on this point.
101. It is worth noting that often information is kept secret to protect its value when it was
attained with great effort. However, such information is not the majority of information held by
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corporations should be given a greater degree of privacy protection
than individuals because of individuals’ desire to interact with others,
and hence should waive privacy protection, is just as easily applicable
to corporations. The existence of any corporation depends on
continuous interaction with workers, neighbors, investors, and
consumers.
Even when we assume that corporations have constitutionally
protected privacy rights, the public’s right to be informed is not
undermined. These two interests—corporations’ privacy rights and
individuals’ right to be informed—can be balanced.
Where
withholding information is motivated by “privacy,” the corporation is
usually attempting to withhold information that might expose
unpleasant facts about it, or act to counter a misrepresentation foisted
upon it by the public. Even if this privacy claim is valid, in such cases
it should be given little weight in comparison to the public’s interest
in supervising corporate practice—similar to how minimal weight
given to sex offenders in the balance with the public’s interest.102
Privacy, like patriotism, could become “the last refuge of the
scoundrel.”
C. ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
• Promoting the Values of Trust: Trust is a social institution of
extreme importance,103 but absent external obligations, it
would be surprising to find a manufacturer who would
voluntarily disclose that he uses components of inferior
quality in his products. But should corporations expect such
information to become public, they would more likely practice
a priori honesty.
• Discovering the Truth and Judicial Efficiency: While discovery
proceedings104 may lead parties to reveal documents of great
public interest, such a finding is coincidental and relies on
corporations, and we refer to protecting such value towards the end of this article.
102. See Rafshoon G. Scott, Community Notification of Sex Offenders: Issues of Punishment,
Privacy and Due Process, 44 EMORY L.J. 1663, 1647–50 (1995).
103. Some consider trust to be a supreme principle, underlying entire fields of law, primarily
contracts law. See Eli Bukspan, The Notion of Trust as a Comprehensive Theory of Contract and
Corporate Law: A New Approach to the Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contract,
2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 229, 231–34 (2006).
104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37; Rule 34(c) compels even nonparties to produce documents.
Some view discovery as a form of “focused freedom of information act, see, e.g., Beermann II,
supra note 16 liberal discovery rules can function like a more focused version of FOIA, opening
a great deal of private information to access by opponents in civil actions, which in turn may
lead to public disclosure of that information”).
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costly legal proceedings.105 Nevertheless, justifications for
document disclosure during legal proceedings equally support
the discovery in the prelegal phase of a dispute. Such
discovery might void the need for legal action altogether and
save the parties expensive billable hours.106
• Fair Competition, Financial Efficiency, and Economic Growth:
While champions of free market principles may argue that
market forces will implement information disclosure but for
economic inefficiencies,107 scholars have successfully disputed
this idea,108 and the recent global economic crisis has turned up
the volume in support of greater corporate transparency,
while arguments advocating secrecy have been less frequent.109
Furthermore, some economists argue information disclosure
would lead to improved risk assessment, which would benefit
investors110 and the market as a whole.111 Finally, general
disclosure obligation would induce more fair competition
because such an obligation may reduce a company’s

105. Discovery takes place when the services of attorneys are already retained, and judicial
time is being consumed. See Amy Luria & John E. Clabby, An Expense out of Control: Rule 33
Interrogatories After the Advent of Initial Disclosures and Two Proposals for Change, 9 CHAP. L.
REV. 29, 30–31 (2005).
106. For the impact of Civil Procedure Rules on the volume of cases that survive pretrial
proceedings, see Stephen C Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 631, 649–54 (1994).
107. ADRIAN HENRIQUES, CORPORATE TRUTH: THE LIMITS TO TRANSPARENCY 13 (2007).
108. Think of Nobel Prizes in Economics conferred upon scholars whose theories focus on
economic insights that the market itself has failed to recognize. For instance Daniel Kahneman,
demonstrating that fairness is a commodity that consumers are willing to pay for—a revelation
that came after centuries in which businesses did not attribute the existence of any real
“market” for fair play. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and
the Assumption of Economics, 59 J. BUS. 285 (1986).
109. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Peace Prize in economics laureate, has described the connection
between the lack of information and the fall of the Lehman Brothers investment bank:
The reason Lehman Brothers went down is twofold; they owned a lot of these bad
assets but also because the products were so non-transparent, because they’ve
engaged in so much of this accounting gimmickry that no one had any confidence.
The financial markets are based on trust . . . . What’s happened has been the lost of
that trust.
Joseph Stiglitz on the Fall of Lehman Brothers (2008), available at bigthink.com/josephstiglitz/
joseph-stiglitz-on-the-fall-of-lehman-brothers.
110. Investors would benefit because financing expenses is lowered where information is
more readily accessible, and thus investors will not be paying the premium for risks and the
expenses of financing investigation,
111. The market would benefit because low financing costs promote investments and growth
Robert K. Elliot & Peter D. Jacobson, Costs and Benefits of Business Information Disclosure, 8
ACCT. HORIZONS 80, 81, 89 (1994). Additional advantages include a more educated allotment
of investments, a more lively transfer of funds, as a result of more easily concluded transactions,
and finally, it would make it much easier to identify those responsible for externalities. Id. at 90,
92.
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competitive advantages from practicing unfair behaviors.
Companies that attempt to reduce costs by using inferior
components, for example, would likely tarnish their public
images. Thus, disclosure would more accurately reflect the
company’s behavior and enhance consumer ability to decide
on which company they wish to support.

V. CORPORATE DISCOSURE POLICIES ARE WHERE
THE WORLD IS (SLOWLY) HEADING
A. THE UNITED STATES
When the U.S. enacted the FOIA112 in 1966, it was the fourth
nation in the world to sign into law anything like it.113 Since then,
many countries have instituted similar FOI laws, and some have even
extended various degrees of FOI laws to corporations, a practice that
has yet to be seen in the U.S.
FOIA provides that only an “agency” shall make available to the
public certain information114 and empowers federal courts to order an
“agency” to produce “agency records improperly withheld from an
individual requesting access.”115 Thus, only “agency records” are
subject to FIOA. The Supreme Court, in Forsham v. Harris116 has
interpreted the “agency records” narrowly and formalistically as to
protect records possessed by a privately controlled organization from
being subject to FIOA, despite the fact that the language of the Act
allows for a more expansive reading.117
In Forsham, the Court held that a private corporation does not
become a public agency because it received grants from a federal
agency. There, a diabetes treatment organization initiated a series of
FOIA requests to the Department of Health (DOH) seeking access
to raw data that was collected in a research that studied the effects of

112. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
113. Following the enactment of similar laws in Sweden (1766), Colombia (1848), and
Finland (1951). For a complete chronological list of freedom of information legislation see
Vleugels, supra note 34.
114. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
115. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
116. 445 U.S. 169 (1980). For an interpretation of the decision, see Aman C. Alfred,
Information, Privacy and Technology: Citizens, Clients or Consumers?, in FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR DAVID WILLIAMS
323, 329 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne Cripps eds., 2000).
117. E.g., see Justice Brennan dissent in Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. at 187.
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certain drugs on diabetes treatment. The study was conducted by
scientists employed at a private organization, which received grants
from DOH for the study. The findings from the study were submitted
to the DOH, but the raw data, which included fifty-five million data
entries, was never received by the DOH. The Court rejected the
argument that data generated by a private organization may be
considered “agency records” for the purposes of the Act, merely
118
because the private organization received federal study grants.
While Congress “sought to expand public rights of access to
Government information when it enacted [FOIA]. . . that expansion
119
was a finite one,” the Court wrote. The fact that Congress refrained
from including private organizations in the scope of FOIA has a
positive meaning of protecting corporations from being subject to
FOIA.120
The Forsham’s decision, which continued to direct federal judges
over the next decades,121 created a strange legal situation where
information possessed by a government agency must be accessible to
the public, but is closed at the moment where the agency pays a
private organization to produce similar information. Furthermore,
the decision tended to disregard the price of keeping the information
secret. The discussion focused on the need to protect the private
organization, and largely ignored considering the right of the
petitioner and the right of public access.122

118. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 182.
119. Id. at 178.
120. Id. at 180–82. In his dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that because the government agency
had used the requested information in its decision making process, it should be considered
information belonging to the agency. Id at 189-90. He further noted, that the “[g]overnment by
secrecy is no less destructive of democracy if it is carried on within agencies or within private
organizations serving agencies. The value of the record to the electorate is not affected . . . .”
Id.
121. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 913 F. Supp. 599 (D.D.C. 1996); Stanley
v. DOD, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23585 (S.D. Ill. June 22, 1999); Burka v. U.S. Dept. of Health
and Human Services, 87 F.3d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Courts have also concluded that FOIA does
not apply to private prisons; See Nicole B. Casarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in
Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 249, 249 (1995) [hereinafter Casarez II].
122. A more flexible discussion of the right to receive information from private organizations
operating in the United States exists in academic discourse. See, e.g., Casarez II, supra 121;
Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra note 16; Beerman II, supra note 16, at 1507; Mathew D.
Bunker & Charles N. Davis, Private Governance, 75 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 464
(1998); Casarez II, supra 121; Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act:
An Analysis of Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21
(1999); Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: The Debate Over Privatization
and Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825 (2000);
Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability,
Professionalism and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005).
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Dissatisfied with the ruling in Forsham, the U.S. Congress in
1998 established an explicit provision that provides any research
information created by public funding would be subject to the Act.123
In 2007, this provision was expanded to cover any information
prepared for a government agency.124 Still, neither U.S. case law nor
the legislator has ever discussed the possibility of ordering a private
corporation to disclose information when it does not have any
connection to a public agency. 125
B. THE UNITED KINGDOM
The U.K. Freedom of Information Act (“U.K. FOIA”)126 applies
fully to private organizations in regard to only one field—the
suppliers of medical services under the National Health Insurance
Act.127 The U.K. FOIA also gives the minister charged with
administering the Act the authority to apply the Act to an
organization that ”appears to the Secretary of State to exercise
functions of a public nature.”128 While the Act appears to grant the
minster expansive authority, attempts to subject additional
organizations to the Act have been disappointing. The two years
consultation that began in 2008 to include additional organizations,
for example, produced poor results,129 as the government rejected the
majority of the public’s suggestions, and announced its intention to
apply the law to only four organizations, all of which perform
functions of an overt public character or are mostly funded by
taxpayers.130 The department rejected suggestions to apply the U.K.
123. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
124. Open Government Act (2007), Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).
125. Does FCC v. AT&T, 131 S.Ct. 1177 (2011), mark a change in the court’s view? While
the decision shows little sympathy to the concerns of the communication mega-corporation, the
answer is most likely negative. The case deals with information clearly held by a federal agency,
and the court’s opinion is based on textual analysis, rather than a substantial discussion on the
merits of access to the information requested.
126. Freedom of Information Act 2000 (ch. 36), available at www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/ acts2000/
ukpga_20000036_en_1.
127. Id. §§ 44, 45.
128. Id. § 5(1).
129. A report by the Department of Justice of the consultation process offers an impressive
account of transparency in the governmental decision making process. It offers a rather
detailed description of submissions received at the ministry and its considerations in accepting
or rejecting them. Freedom of Information Act 2000: Designation of Additional Public
Authorities—Response to Consultation, available at http://www.data.parliament.uk/
DepositedPapers/Files/ DEP2009-2167/DEP2009-2167.pdf.
130. The four organizations subject to U.K. FIOA are 1) Association of Chief Police
Officers, which plays a role in the development of police services; 2) Financial Ombudsman
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FOIA to powerful corporations such as big retail chains, private
schools, and corporations that provide vital services or operate on the
The
government
basis of a contract with a public authority.131
provided three reasons for its decision:
1. The high costs that might be imposed on the corporations;
2. The projected additional workload that would beset the
government administration to implement the legislation; and
3. The "economic climate" that has changed since the beginning
of the consultation, such that the government should not
burden corporations in economically distressed times.
Yet another round of consultation was launched in 2011,132 and in
this round, the government asked a long list of corporations, including
McDonalds,133 to opine on the possibility of being subject to the Act.
C. ISRAEL
The Israeli Freedom of Information Law134 applies exclusively to
“classic” public agencies, which, the Israeli Supreme Court has stated,
is a “closed list.”135 A 2005 amendment added government-owned
corporations—entities that operate in the field of private law, and
some include private shareholders—to the list of agencies subject to
the law.136

Service, which among other tasks, resolves disputes between consumers and financial
institutions; 3) University and College Admission Service; and 4) “Academies,” i.e., nonprofit
educational institutions.
131. Freedom of Information Act 2000: Designation of Additional Public Authorities—
Response to Consultation, at 14–16.
132. See Extending the coverage of Freedom of Information Act 2000 under Section 5,
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE IMPACT ASSESSMENT PAPER, Mar. 4, 2011, available at www.cfoi.org.uk/
MoJ_ draftimpactassessments5.pdf.
133. See Martin Roesenbaum, A Big Mac with extra FOIs, please, BBC NEWS, Jan. 9, 2012,
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16443404.
134. Freedom of Information Law 5758-1998, available at www.freedominfo.org/wp-content/
uploads/documents/Israel--FOIL1998.pdf.
135. AdminA 3493/06 Alroy v. the Eged Pension Fund [2006]. In another case the Supreme
Court refused to bring the committee in charge of appointing judges under the scope of the law,
in spite of its clear public nature. The court ruled that “the legislator has chosen not to leave the
list of public agencies open, enumerating ten categories of agencies. Hence, only those
organizations that fit under one of those categories are to be considered public agencies for
purposes of the law,” HCJ 2283/07 Jurists for Eretz Israel Legal Forum for the Israeli Land v.
the Committee for Judicial Appointments [2008].
136. Freedom of Information Law (amendment 5) 5767-2007. Israel’s Government
Corporations Law defines any company where the state holds more than 50% voting rights as a
“Government Corporation.” Government Corporations Law 5735-1975 § 1.
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Under Israel’s FOI law, the public may request information from
corporations in two ways. First, if the information requested is of
contracts and communications between private corporations and
public agencies, the requestors may appeal to the public agency to
attain such information.137 Second, if the information requested are
reports that the corporation is required to submit to regulators or the
information is of the type that are collected by regulators under their
statutory authority, the requestors may request such information by
filing requests with the appropriate regulators that supervise or
contract with the private organization.
Even with such a robust FOI regime, courts rely heavily on
exemptions under FOI law designed to protect commercial secrets138
and interests to waive disclosure obligations. In Keshet Broadcasting
v. The Second Authority for Television & Radio,139 the Second
Authority, the regulator of commercial broadcast in Israel, decided to
disclose tender bids submitted by the petitioners that won a TV
broadcasting concession. This was in response to a FOI request
submitted by two NGOs—the Movement for Freedom of Information
in Israel and the Directors and Scriptwriters Association. The
Supreme Court ruled that the main objective of the FOI law was to
expose the way public agencies operate to the public, not to “cause
harm to anyone providing the government agency with information.140
Thus, “only a very strong public interest could justify exposing
financial information of a private and commercial organization.”141
Despite strong public interest in a public resource (e.g., broadcast
waves) and a clear public interest in supervising one of only two
commercial TV channels in that nation, the court treated the private
corporations as owners of the information they were obliged by law
to hand to the public authority, and thus the corporations could bar
public access.
The court concluded that Israel’s FOI law was not designed to
bring about the delivery of information that was obtained by the

137. Israel’s Supreme Court has ruled that such connections should be exposed as a general
rule, and are “Information with a clear public character.” AdminA 6576/01 Liran v. HaHevar
LeYizum CPM v. Liran PD 56(6) 817 [2002].
138. Section 9(b)(6) to the law. The courts interpret this exemption widely, in contrast to
other exemptions designed to benefit public agencies which are interpreted much more
narrowly. This displays an intent to leave private corporations unaffected by the “transparency
revolution.” It might be expected that if the law were to be amended to cover private entities,
and the legislator would make clear its will to see corporations accountable to the public, a
change in judicial interpretation would follow.
139. AdminA 10845/06 Keshet Broadcasting v. The Second Authority for Television and
Radio Channel Two [2007].
140. See supra note 139, at 18.
141. Keshet, art. 101.
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public agency from a private organization. The Israeli parliament
explicitly rejected this notion in relation to environmental affairs. The
“Environmental Information Law”142 and its regulations state
explicitly that in regard to pollutant emissions information, private
information obtained by a public agency is to be disclosed.
Much like in the U.S., courts are more willing to release
corporate information during the discovery phase of litigation than
when the public requests information outside of the litigation
context.143
D. SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa provides a robust framework, unparalleled to other
nations, for granting the public access to information.144 Article 32 of
the South African constitution145 provides everyone “the right of
access to any information held by the state; and any information that
is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or
protection of any rights.” Indeed, South Africa is the first nation to
legally grant the public rights to access information from private
entities, regardless of the entities’ statutory status, public character, or
relationship to a public authority.146
Under the Promotion of Access to Information Act (2000)
(“PAIA”)147 a requester must be given access to any record of a
142. Freedom of Information Law 5765-2005 (amendment 3 – Environmental Information).
143. See e.g., ORC 21945/08 High Net v. Hot (92009) (The Tel Aviv District Court ruled in
2009 that the “Hot” cable broadcasting company would have to disclose to the defendants
complete information regarding customers’ complaints received by the companies, as well as the
results of internal service satisfaction surveys the company conducted. This demand for
disclosure would have been dismissed as ludicrous if it had been made by a consumer
organization for the purpose of publishing the company’s service record.); see also, CAA
Levayev v. Rephaeli (2009) (The court ordered billionaire Lev Levayev to disclose minutes
from his company’s board of directors meetings to a board member who wanted to prove a
claim he had made in a legal proceeding against Levayev, to which the billionaire had withheld
vital information from a bank negotiating of the purchase of company shares. A similar request
for information made by a journalist would not have been heard in the Israeli law system.).
144. Despite the sophistication of South African freedom of information regime, the public
does not frequently use its right to receive information from private organizations Richard
Calland. Prizing Open the Profit Making World, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: TRANSPARENCY
FOR AN OPEN WORLD 214, 232 (Ann Florini ed., 2007).
145. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 , available at www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/index.htm.
146. This unusual legislation may be understood in the context of an accelerated
privatization process that was taking place at time of its enactment. See, Afeikhena Jerome,
Privatization and Regulation in South Africa–An Evaluation, Paper presented at the 3d
International Conference on Pro-Poor Regulation and Competition: Issues, Policies and
Practices, Cape Town - South Africa 7-9 September 2004, available at www.competitionregulation.org.uk/conferences/southafrica04/ Afeikhena.pdf.
147. Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter PAIA]. For a
description of the legislative process and failed attempt to prevent the application of PAIA to

PELED_JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2013

CORPORATE INFORMATION

2/4/2013 1:15 PM

291

private organization if that “record is required for the exercise or
protection of any rights.”148 While PAIA provides for several
exceptions for mandatory disclosure, section 70 of the PAIA
overrides these exceptions. Section 70 provides that a private
organization must grant a request for access to a record if disclosure
would reveal evidence of substantial violations of the law or imminent
danger to the public or environment, or when the public interest in
disclosure outweighs the interest for the particular exception.149
Notwithstanding the expansive language of the Article 32 and
PAIA, courts, however, have construed the public right to access
information of private corporations narrowly. In Institute for
Democracy in South Africa v. African Nat’l Congress, the Institute for
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) petitioned the High Court of
South Africa in Cape County to compel the private corporations to
the suit to disclose records of their contributions to political parties.150
At issue was whether the record requested is required for the exercise
or protection of the constitutional rights to “fair elections” and to
“free political choice.”151 Construing these rights narrowly, the High
Court only referred to them as rights to direct participation in
elections. Holding for the private corporations, the Court found that
IDASA failed to demonstrate why the requested information was
necessary for the exercise or defense of the rights direct participate in
elections.152
Departing somewhat from the decision in IDASA, the South
Africa Supreme Court of Appeals, held that a contractual right can
serve as a basis to obligate a corporation to grant a requester
information access under PAIA.153 There, the court ordered the
South African Airlines Corporation to disclose the full details of the
company’s seat reservation, as opposed to partial data, for one of its
flights to the company’s retired employee where he was an denied

private entities, see Gideon Pimstone, Going Quietly About Their Business: Access to Corporate
Information and the Open Democracy Bill, 15 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 2 (1999); Doug Tilton,
Richard Calland, In Pursuit of Open Democracy and Freedom of Information – A South African
Campaign Study, 8 CHRI NEWS (2001), available at www.humanrightsinitiative.org/
publications/nl/ articles/south_africa/in_pursuit_of_open_democracy_foi.pdf.
148. PAIA, art. 50(1)(a).
149. PAIA, art. 70.
150. Inst. for Democracy in S. Afr. et al. v. African Nat’l. Cong. et al., 2005 (5) SA 39 (C).
151. Id. at ¶ 81.
152. See supra note 150; see also, Clutchco (Pty) Ltd v. Davis, 2005 (3) SA 486 (SCA) (the
court declined a shareholder’s request to access the company’s accounting records in order for
him to properly evaluate the value of his stocks where he claimed the unreliability of the
company’s financial statements, because the shareholder did not show cause to doubt the
reliability of the financial report. For a criticism of the lower court’s decision to uphold the
appeal, see
153. Claase v. Info. Office of S. Afr. Airways, 2006 SCA 163 (RSA) at para. 7.
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automatic upgrade to first class before other passengers when seats
are available. This benefit was part of his retirement package. The
retired employee wished to prove that the company had upgraded
other passengers before making the seat available to him first.
Undoubtedly, the recognition of public access to corporate
information empowers citizens in their dealings with corporations.
Yet, courts often continue to give deference to corporations’ decision
to deny access to information, unless the requestor can demonstrate a
material need for such information in order to protect a right that
would otherwise be difficult to defend, and that the interest for access
outweighs interest of the corporation for nondisclosure.
Most FOI laws around the world have been enacted over that
past twenty years,154 yet little attention has been given to the question
of corporate information. Still, a slowly accelerating trend can be
identified where more recent FOI laws recognize some partial aspects
of the right to access corporate information.155

VI. FROM THE EXISTING TO THE PROPOSED
This article has thus far presented a variety of existing
arrangements for receiving some information from corporations.

154. These information laws have been acted at a time when many of the legislating
countries were undergoing an accelerated process of privatization (especially in the Eastern
European countries), and when there was a heightened awareness of the growing power of
corporations.
155. E.g., The New Zealand FOIA of 1982 is one of the oldest FOI laws, and yet it
established a rather broad approach to the disclosure of information possessed by private
corporations, even in comparison to the more recent legislation of other countries. Official
Information Act 1982 (N.Z.). The legislation applies to information possessed by a contractor
that is performing work for a public authority, on condition that the information came into his
possession in relation to the work that is being performed for the authority. Id. at art. 2(5).
The Irish FOIA uses a similar approach. The Freedom of Information Act 1997 (Act
No. 13/1997) (Ir.) § 6(9).
The Dutch FOIA establishes in section 3(1) that any person has the right to receive
information from a corporation performing work for an executive authority, on the condition
that the information exists in documents relating to an executive matter. Government
Information (Public Access) Act (1991).
A recent call for amending an FOI law to cover corporations was delivered in
Bangladesh by the country’s Chief Information Commissioner, stating that: “Most of the
corporate companies and giant financial institutions in the country remain out of the jurisdiction
of the act. But people have the right to know about their activities and financial dealings.” CIC
Suggests Amending RTI Act for Transparency, THE DAILY STAR, July 21, 2010,
www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/ news-details.php?nid=147630. For more on the CIC’s views
on the matter, see Bangladeshi Commissioner Supports Wider Coverage, FREEDOMINFO.ORG,
Aug. 4, 2010, www.freedominfo.org/ 2010/08/bangladeshi-commissioner-supports-widercoverage.
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This article will now examine why these mechanisms are insufficient if
our wish is to enjoy the advantages of transparency as a tool to enable
public oversight of corporations. Next, the article will demonstrate
how a “general disclosure duty” for corporations can be framed to
meet the shortcoming of these other models, without severely
harming legitimate corporate concerns.
A. WHAT IS PROPOSED?
This article proposes a model that imposes a legal duty on
corporation for “general disclosure” of information. Similarly to
existing Freedom of Information Laws, the model creates a
presumption of openness that is rebuttable only if the request falls
under certain procedural categories, or if the information is one that
falls under certain exemptions. Unlike existing FOI laws, however,
additional substantial or procedural exceptions may be needed to
protect legitimate corporate interests.
The model is not far-reaching once certain reasonable limitations
are established. As we know it, FOIA includes a long list of
exemptions.
Such exemptions will clearly apply to private
corporations as well. For instance “trade secrets”156 will remain
exempt from disclosure, meeting many of the legitimate fears that
may arise from a general disclosure regime.157
B. WHY EXISTING MODELS FALL SHORT

1. Specified Disclosure Obligations
One method of imposing a legal duty of disclosure is to specify
certain fields that would be subject to disclosure obligations, such as
finance, consumerism and the environment.
Experience
demonstrates that legislators in democratic countries are attentive to
the promotion of transparency, and thus there is a high likelihood
that significant progress could be accomplished in this way. However,
this model suffers from the following disadvantages:
A biased list of disclosure: Imposing disclosure in any one field
requires robust lobbying efforts that include effective public relations
156. FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
157. On the other hand, other exemptions that clearly conflict the proposed model will have
to be omitted, for instance “financial information obtained from a person.” Id.
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campaigns and the involvement of influential individuals or by
garnering enough political will. Finance, consumer affairs, and the
environment, classic examples of the specified disclosure model, have
benefitted from strong lobbying efforts. The environment movement,
for example benefitted from powerful public relations being
supported by celebrities and environmental activists in wealthy
countries. Other areas that do not have the same support to lobby for
their causes, such as the protection of worker rights158 and minorities
against corporations,159 face a steep uphill battle. Imposing a general
obligation of disclosure would allow the weaker players to demand
and receive the information that they need, regardless of the other
strengths of their campaign.
Delayed disclosure: In many situations, disclosure laws come
only after the public incurs significant harm.
Food labeling
requirements, for example, came only after the public had become
more aware of manufacturers' manipulations of products.160 Financial
disclosure laws followed the financial crisis of 1929 and the Enron and
Worldcom affairs. Disclosure requirement for pollutant emissions
followed the deaths of thousands in Bhopal, India, from the release of
methyl isocyanate into the air from a nearby factory.161 Access to
corporate information might have led to the exposure of priceless
information at a much earlier stage that could have prevented harm.
Limited Disclosure: While specific disclosure requirements have
led to the exposure of vast amounts of information from private
corporations, the amount of information of public importance held in
the corporate hands is so vast that no legislator can view the
information picture in its entirety to decide what should be exposed
and what would be of interest in the future. “Much important data
158. In the mid-1980s there was an attempt in the European Commission to enact a directive
that would impose a duty on any employer of a thousand or more employees to share with them
information on a series of matters. The proposal known as the “Vredeling Directive” (named
after the Commission’s Dutch Labor commissioner Henk Vredeling) was defeated by pressure
of large employers in Europe, and even employers from the U.S. who invested large sums of
money in lobbying against it. See generally LABOR AND AN INTEGRATED EUROPE (Llyod
Ulman, Barry Eichengreen & William T. Dickens eds. 1993).
159. For example, in South Africa, in the case of Pretorius v. Nedcor Bank an individual
whose bank refused to grant a loan petitioned to receive information from the bank regarding
its risk assessment criteria regarding loan requestors. The case dealt with the highly sensitive
issue of racially or geographically based customer discrimination. See Richard Calland, Prizing
Open the Profit Making World, in THE TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD 232 (Ann
Florini ed. 2007).
160. Ilyse D. Barkan, Industry Invites Regulation: The Passage of the Pure Food and Drug
Act of 1906, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 18, 20 (1985).
161. Christine Overdevest & Brian Mayer, Harnessing the Power of Information for the Next
Generation of Environmental Law: I. Collection and Construction of Information: Harnessing
the Power of Information Through Community Monitoring: Insights from Social Science, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1493, 1508 (2008).
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simply cannot be expressed in a form suitable for standardized
disclosure.”162 Thus, only a general rule of disclosure would enable
individuals and independent groups to navigate this ocean of
information in search of items that, to their best judgment, are
publicly important.
Disclosing in Conflict of Interest: In the current disclosure
model, corporations are given too much discretion in how they
present their information to the public. Even if they carry out their
legal duties in good faith, corporations may have conflicts of interest
that cause them to edit the disclosed information. A general
disclosure system would allow access to the corporation’s raw
information, without mediation beyond the technical function of
delivering the document.
2. Disclosure by Regulators
As the public’s trustee, regulators should collect and disclose
information from corporations they deem appropriate to protect the
public’s interest while balancing the interests of corporations for
nondisclosure. But such a model suffers from at least three
disadvantages. First, the model suffers from similar biases problems
as described in the “Specified Obligation Disclosure” model as only
those issues that gain sufficient political will be subject to disclosure.
Second, the regulators’ ability to examine information collected is
limited by the resources at their disposal. Thus, a general disclosure
obligation that utilizes the full extent of the power of the public would
result in a better and more efficient use of the information held by the
regulator.163
Another problem with this model is the lack of supervision. In
the absence of access to raw information, the public is unable to
ascertain whether the regulator has made the full information
available, and whether she acted properly with the information

162. RUSSEL STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION 13 (1980)
163. An example of the utilization of public power in the public sphere is the “MPs expenses
scandal” in the U.K. In the course of this scandal, hundreds of thousands of expense claims
filed by MPs for items ranging from dog food to chimney sweeping at private homes. The
information was released following a five-year legal debate and caused a scandal that brought
about the resignation of the house speaker, five cabinet ministers and several MPs. Once the
information was published, first in the Daily Telegraph to which it was leaked before its official
release, and later in other newspapers, the public at large was asked to review the millions of
documents to help the press identify items of interest (in what is known to internet savvies as
“cloudsourcing”). For an overview of the scandal, see MPs Expenses, BBC NEWS, May 25, 2010;
for the cloudsourcing operation launched by “the Guardian” newspaper, see Investigate Your
MPs Expenses, THE GUARDIAN, http://mps-expenses.guardian.co.uk (last visited Aug. 12, 2012)
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available to her. Even qualified regulators will occasionally make
mistakes. A report prepared for the U.S. Congress in 1990 showed
that of 198 drugs that were approved by the FDA in 1976-1985, no
less than 102 that were later found to be significantly dangerous.164
Thus, some of these mistakes could have been prevented if
individuals and consumer protection groups were given access to
inspect the information.
Another problem relates to the connection between the
regulator and the corporations. Regulators engage in daily working
relationships with their regulated corporations. Some may have been
previous employees of these companies or wish to become one in the
future. Even assuming such a problem does not exist, the regulator
needs the corporation’s cooperation. Thus, regulators are likely to
identify with corporate concerns rather than those of the public they
represent.165
3. Disclosure through Discovery of Documents in Legal Proceedings
A great deal of information is discovered during the discovery
process of legal proceedings. While expanding the scope of existing
disclosure obligations in legal proceedings may be a viable option,
such a model is neither efficient nor just. The model is inefficient
because the requestor must go through a number of unnecessary
hearings and lengthy depositions to gain access to such information.
The model is unjust because those unable to devote time or lack
financial resources will likely be forced to abandon their case. If
individuals could manage to get the information without needing a
court order, they could more reliably assess their chances in court,
and would not be forced to abandon their case. This would serve to
promote the general interest of the public to discover the truth and
the private interests of individual plaintiffs.

164. The report is discussed in the minority opinion in Int’l Dairy Foods.
165. This phenomenon is known as “Regulatory Capture.” See Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective
Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1954); see
generally Toni Makkai & John Braithwhaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense
of Regulatory Capture, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y 61 (1992).
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C. POSSIBLE MODELS FOR RECOGNITION OF FREEDOM OF
CORPORATE INFORMATION

1. Applying the Act to Corporations Enjoying Taxpayer Funding
Corporation that derive a certain minimum percent of income
from taxpayer money would be considered "public authorities" for
the purposes of the act. Taxpayer dollars includes money received in
government grants, contracts, etc., regardless of the formal mode of
transaction. More recent FOI laws adopt such a model.
The upside to this model is that it significantly widens the
application of the Act to private organizations. The downside,
however, is that the basis for distinguishing between those
corporations that enjoy government funding and those that do not is
problematic. The model presupposes that because taxpayers fund
these companies via the government, some property arises and
attaches to the information.
This model addresses only the
proprietary justification for disclosure, which is not necessarily the
most compelling. I have shown that there are other justifications that
would apply to corporations who do not enjoy public funds, and those
would not be covered by this model. Furthermore, this model would
create some uncertainty by raising such questions as to whether
government grants the same as government payments for services.
2. Applying the Act to Organizations Fulfilling a Public Service
FOIA would apply to any organization “fulfilling a public
service.” Regulators may choose to define classes of activities an
organization must operate to be considered “fulfilling a public
service,” which may include but not limited to activities in education,
health, communications, environment, and infrastructure. While the
more modern FIO laws have adopted this model, those countries
constitute a minority of the world’s ninety FOI laws.
The prominent advantage of this model is that it significantly
expands a large number of corporations subject to the proposed act
that are deemed fulfilling a public service. But as discussed
throughout this article, many corporations in purely commercial and
non-public fields may also be of interest to the public, mainly due to
the enormous power they amass. Thus, an energy or infrastructure
would both be subject to disclosure obligations, for example, where
there is a public interest in ensuring equality to employees and
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consumers, and where relating to a chain of coffee shops which
apparently would not be subject to the provisions of the act.
3. Applying the Act to Information of Public Nature
Organizations subject to FOIA are determined by the content of
the information necessary for the exercise or protection of human
rights, and not the organizations’ statutory status. This model
borrows from South Africa PAIA’s framework. The advantage of
this model is that, if interpreted broadly, it grants the public rights to
access almost any piece of information. There is, however, negligible
difference between this model and the general disclosure described
below. The disadvantage of this model is that it is subject to narrow
judicial interpretation, as seen in the South African case,166 even when
the language may not call for it. Also, the model presupposes that
absent a positive justification, the default position is nondisclosure.
This model also has three procedural problems. First, the
requestor often does not know if the requested information is
necessary for the protection of his rights. For example, a member of
a minority group requesting to access a company's hiring guidelines to
determine whether it practices racially discriminatory practices could
mislead the requestor by disclosing that its hiring guidelines do not
refer to any protected class when the guidelines do indeed require
prospective employees is a native speaker of the nation’s language.
Second, the requestor bears the burden to show that the information
in question has a bearing on the requestor’s rights. The presumption
should be for disclosure unless the corporation can show a valid and
strong argument against disclosure, as the corporation is in a better
position to do so. Third, requiring the requestor to bear the burden
of proof gives corporations the ability to put up legal hurdles that
would make it bureaucratically complex and burdensome for the
requestors and thus effectively deterring future disclosure inquires.
D. GENERAL DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION
A key feature of the U.S. and other FOI laws is that public
authorities are required to respond to any request,167 irrespective of

166. See section VI.D; see generally Inst. for Democracy in S. Afr. et al. v. African Nat’l Cong.
et. al., 2005 (5) SA 39 (C).
167. See e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (1966).
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the requestor’s motive.168 Unlike these FOI laws, however, a general
disclosure model for corporations recognizes that there are occasions
when the corporation has “legitimate interest” in refusing to disclose
the requested information. A corporation refusing an information
request must show why such request serves an “illegitimate interest”
or no interest at all. The law should make clear that the threshold for
disclosure is low, such that only those frivolous requests are
dismissed. Illegitimate requests are ones that mainly serve the
financial interest of another person or corporation because
compelling corporations to reveal information that serves no other
purpose but the financial interest of another would be unreasonable
and unfair. Disclosure should not be used as a tool for companies to
compete with one another in the marketplace. In applying this type
of disclosure requirement to corporations, legislators could simply
add a section to the U.S. FOIA that states that the provisions of the
FOIA also apply to commercial corporations, with exceptions
tailored to corporations listed in a separate clause.
1. Advantages
The first advantage of this model is that it subjects all profitoriented organizations, with prescribed exceptions listed in
169
regulations, to disclosure requirements. To encourage the idea that
access to information is a right, the requestors do not need to
examine the nature of the organization (e.g., the organization’s
operations and activities), or the sources of its funding, reducing the
requestors’ need to expend extraneous resources to investigate
organization nor legal fees to ascertain whether he has such a right to
request information.
Second, because this model creates a presumptive right for the
requestors’ access to corporate information, social change
organizations, which are the entities likely to make information
disclosure requests, would be more encouraged to avail themselves to
the right. Relatedly, corporations bears the burden of proving that
they meet one of the prescribed exceptions of the legislation and thus

168. As is clearly stated in several FOI laws, including: Freedom of Information Act 1982
(Cth) s 11(2) (Austl.); The Freedom of Information Act 1997 (Act No. 13/1997) (Ir.) § 8(4);
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 § 11(3) (S. Afr.); Freedom of Information
Law, 5758-1998 (Isr.) § 7(a).
169. The regulations may, for instance, exempt small organizations such as those employing
less than a certain number of employees, or with annual income that is lower than a set
threshold.
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bear the costs of making a defense, as opposed to the requestors, who
are often the ones with less resources to carry such a burden.
Finally, the model applies generally to the type of information
that can be requested since there would not be a pre-determined
limitation on the content that can be requested. This means that
there is less room for legal disputes and delay tactics even before a
request is considered on its merits. It also means less room for
corporations to manipulate the characterization of information. This
will teach corporations to no longer rely on legal tactics to avoid
disclosure and instead take the measures to adjust their organizations
to be more transparent.
2. Disadvantages
While the broad scope of this model yield the aforementioned
advantages, it also produces some distinct disadvantages. First, it
would be unjustifiable, for instance, to impose the same disclosure
obligation on a local grocery store as to a retail chain due to the
different degrees of influence they have on matters of public
concerns. While a local grocery store may have an interest in such
local matters as where to locate waste facilities in a city, corporations
hold much more influence over public matters at large. Also, small
businesses generally lack the resources to comply with information
requests. To rectify this problem, organizations of a certain size, as
measured by some combinations of number of employees or assets,
should be exempt from the general disclosure obligation. While this
may cause some uncertainties, these cases would exist on the margins
because smaller organizations are rarely the kind of organizations
that hold information that could have a significant impact on society
as larger corporations.
The second disadvantage of the general disclosure obligation is
the danger of forcing corporations to disclose information to any
requestors, including those seeking information to harm the company,
those engaging in commercial espionage, or those who have other
inappropriate motives. A possible solution to this problem is to
institute an identification requirement for information seekers. This
identification requirement would enable the private corporations, in
good faith, to carefully weigh to whom the information is disclosed.
Where disclosure would triggers security or industrial espionage
concerns, legislators could easily include these scenarios to the
disclosure exemption list; these types of exemptions already exist in
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most FOI laws.170 Additionally, to curtail those from engaging in
“obsessive” requests,171 corporations should be allowed to dismiss
frivolous or vexatious requests outright. To prevent corporations
from abusing this right, include language in the statute to clarify that
the ability to dismiss frivolous requests only applies to unusual
situations.
The final disadvantage of this model is compliance costs.172 As a
solution, there can be a general rule that the requestors bear the costs
of the inquiry and where corporations are required to disclose only
the information readily available. This rule would be more forgiving
than the current FOIA that requires public authorities to conduct
extensive search and retrieval operation.173

VII. CONCLUSION
Just as the right to freedom of information redistributed power
between the government and its citizenry, it should now redistribute
power between corporations and individuals to protect the public
interest by ensuring the proper conduct of corporate activity. This
article has argued that corporations do not have an inherent right to
deny individuals access to information. Imposing a general duty to
disclose on corporations requires a revolution of thought. Corporate
employees must become accustomed to the idea that they may need
to explain to the public, under certain circumstances, their actions.
Corporations will need to be more upfront and honest. The public,
and especially journalists and civil society organizations, must be
educated to ask for meaningful information that could improve
society and advance the defense of civil liberties. Legislators may
need to establish proper mechanisms to ensure corporate compliance
while avoiding placing too much burden on them. Courts will need to
be active in clarifying the legal standard. Challenging as the task may
be, the result will be a significant contribution to the protection of the
public interests.
170. See e.g., exemption 4 of FOIA that covers “trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.”
171. Indeed some FOI laws try to deal with this problem. Section 14(1) to the U.K. FOIA
(supra note 34) allows a public authority not to comply with a request on the grounds that it is
“vexatious.” The British Information Commission has issued guidelines on when a request is to
www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/
library/
be
viewed
as
vexatious:
ICO,
freedom_of_information/ practical_application/vexatious_requests_a_short_guide.pdf.
172. For an estimate of the annual cost of FOI in several countries, see The Best Things in
Life are Free: How Much Does FOI Cost?, CONST. UNIT BLOG, Apr. 11, 2010,
www.constitution-unit.com/2011/04/11/the-best-things-in-life-are-free-how-much-does-foi-cost.
173. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(C) (1966).
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